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MILL RUN F3-1543 



THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE- 
HIDALGO 



JESSE S. REEVES 



REPRINTED FROM THE 



g^mrncau ^i^toticat §mm 



VOL. X No. 



JANUARY, 1905 



^ 






[Keprinted from Tfik Amkrican IIisiorrai, Rknu'W, \'o1. X., Sit. 2, Jan., 1^05. J 



THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE-HIDALGO 

The treaty of peace with Mexico was signed February 2. 184S, 
at the town of Guadahipe-Hidalgo. It has appended to it the name 
of but one American, that of Nicholas P. Trist, who admitted that 
he had no authority at the time to represent the United States. The 
government at Washington had canceled his powers, denied his 
authority, and ordered him to leave the headquarters of the invading 
army and return home. Various views have been published regarding 
his actions. Trist has been called a far-sighted patriot, who by dis- 
obeying orders sacrificed his own reputation in order that he might 
put an end to the Mexican War and give to his country the legitimate 
fruits of victory. His motives have, on the other hand, been repre- 
sented as based upon inordinate vanity, which blinded him to the 
manifest obligations of his mission and gave his name a distinction 
which his character by no means justified. It is the purpose of this 
paper to trace the history of the negotiations of which the Guadalupe- 
Hidalgo treaty was the result in the light of the mass of correspond- 
ence to be found in the archives of the Department of State, a part 
of which has never been printed. The diary of James K. Polk, a 
manuscript copy of which is in the Lenox Library, New York, 
furnishes a running commentary upon the peace negotiations, and 
by it the President of fifty years ago takes us into his confidence as 
fully as he did his own cabinet.^ 

The history of the Mexican War, aside from the purely military 
part of it, has been written chiefly as a chapter in the history of the 
slavery question. The momentous national issues which pressed for 
attention even before Polk retired from office have given a twist to 
the many accounts of the period from 1845 to 1848. Books appearing 
soon after the event, animated not by a spirit of unbiased historical 
investigation, but written with the professed purpose of presenting 
a brief against the aggressions of slavery, have furnished in large 
measure the materials for the history of the period. The treatment 
of the subject of the Mexican War in the " reviews " of Jav' and 

' Acknowledgment is here made to the authorities of tlie I.enox Library for permis- 
sion to use parts of Polly's diary. 

2 William Jay, A Review of Ihe Causes and Coiiseijiiences of the Mexiian War 
(Boston, 1849). 

(309 ) 



3IO J. S. Reeves 

Livermore\ well-constructed as they were and widely distributed, 
and fortified by an examination of published documents and news- 
papers, has grown into the narrative of Von Hoist. 

When Congress was told that by the act of Mexico there existed 
a state of war, and that Santa Anna was permitted to pass into Vera 
Cruz, Polk and his advisers were convinced that the war would be a 
:short one, perhaps not ninety days in length. The diary informs us 
ithat when Polk came into office he had already made up his mind to 
.•acquire California. A plan developed by which he believed the 
acquisition might be made by peaceful negotiation. Claims against 
Alexico, under discussion as far back as Jackson's time, furnished 
■.the groundwork of the plan ; the joint resolution annexing Texas 
.gave the President something to build upon. By that act the de- 
termination of the boundaries of Texas rested with the United 
States. Mexico could not pay the claims in cash ; the Texan boundary 
was unsettled. The idea of territorial indemnity was an irresistible 
conclusion : let her pay in land. 

Two weeks after Polk was inaugurated, a secret agent, William 
S. Parrott, left Washington for Mexico to prepare a way for the 
reopening of diplomatic relations. By autumn the reports of the 
agent led Polk to believe that Mexico would receive a representative 
from the United States. John Black, the United States consul at the 
'City of Mexico, wrote to Buchanan that he had positive and official 
assurance that the Mexican ministry was favorable to an adjustment 
of the questions in dispute between the two republics. The consul's 
letter was received November 9 ; on the tenth John Slidell, who had 
been selected by Polk two months previously,^ was sent upon " one 
of the most delicate and important [missions] which has ever been 
confided to a citizen of the United States ", one which, if successful, 
Buchanan told him, would establish for the envoy " an enviable repu- 
tation " and do an " immense service " for his country.-'' This was 
no sham mission. Parrott, the secret agent, had reported that Mexico 
would not fight. The notoriously peaceful proclivities of the R-Iexican 
president, Herrera, warranted the hope that some sort of a settlement 
might be quickly arranged. " An Envoy possessing suitable qualifica- 
tions for this Court ", wrote Parrott, " might with comparative ease. 

' Abie! Abbot Liverraore, '1 he War with Mexico Kcrirtuetl {V>aiAov\, 1850). 

'Buchanan to Slidell, .September 17 1S45 ; Slidell to Buchanan, September 25, 
1845. See George TicUnor Curtis, Life oj James Biicliannn, I, 591. 

'Buchanan to Slidell, November 10, 1845 ; called for by re.solution of the House, 
January 4, 1S48, ard refused by Polk, January 13, 1848 ; see H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Con- 
gress, I Session, 770; also No. 25, p. i ; printed in S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, I 
Session, 71, with the correspondence concerning the treaty of peace with Mexico. 



The Treaty of Guadalupe- Hidalgo 311 

settle, over a breakfast, the most important national question. "' The 
instructions to John Slidell covered more than Mexico anticipated. 
Xo sooner had the envoy appeared in Vera Cruz than broadsides 
scattered over the City of Mexico told of his plans : to negotiate with 
the JNIexican government for the sale of Texas, New Mexico, and the 
Californias.- Such in fact were Slidell's instructions. He was 
authorized to assume the claims, fix the boundary of the United 
States at the Rio Grande, and obtain the cession of New Mexico and 
Upper California for a sum not to exceed twenty-five millions of 
dollars.^ The administration of Herrera, weaker even than most 
revolutionary governments in Mexico, was accused of a traitorous 
attempt at the disintegration of the country. To save itself from 
revolution it refused to receive Slidell because his powers were too 
great, since he was named as minister instead of as commis- 
sioner ad hoc to settle the Texas question, and by so doing Herrera 
countered Polk's policy. The refusal, however, did not improve 
the situation. The peaceful Herrera gave way to the warlike Par- 
edes. Polk, in anticipation of Slidell's ultimate failure, ordered 
Taylor to the Rio Grande. Instead of calling Slidell home, he was 
directed to make further efforts to obtain recognition. Buchanan 
wrote to Slidell, March 12, 1846' : 

The Oregon question is rapidly approaching a crisis. By the Steam 
Packet which will leave Liverpool on the 4th April, if not by that which 
left on the 4th instant, the President expects information which will be 
decisive on the subject. The prospect is that our differences with Great 
Britain may be peacefully adjusted, though this is by no means certain. 
Your return to the United States before the result is known, would pro- 
duce considerable alarm in the public mind and might possibly exercise 
an injurious influence on our relations with Great Britain. 

By the time this letter was read by Slidell he had exhausted all 
pretexts for remaining in Mexico and was on his way home. The 
plan of acquiring California by peaceful means was a failure. 

' Parrott to Buchanan, August 26, 1845, received September 16, 1845. MS., De- 
partment of State Archives, Despatches, Mexico, vol. 12. It will be noticed that this 
letter from Parrott was received the day before Buchanan wrote to Slidell, offering him 
the Mexican mission. 

^A copy of this broadside, called La Voz del Pueblo, was sent to Buchanan by 
Slidell. It bears date of December 3, 1845, ^"d is headed: " La traicion se ha de- 
scubierto ! . . . Mr. Slidell, ministro nombrado por los Estados-Unidos, para arreglar 
con el gobierno actual la venta de Tejas, Nuevo-Mexico y las Californias.'' Slidell's 
first letter from the City of Mexico, dated December 17, 1845, was received by Buchanan 
January 12, 1846. 'Taylor was ordered to the Rio Grande the following day. 

•Buchanan to Slidell, November lo, 1845, S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, i Ses- 
sion, 71. 

* Buchanan to Slidell, March 12, 1846, MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, 
Department of State, Instructions, Mexico, vol. 16, p. 43. 



312 J. S. /beeves 

" War . . . exists by the act of Mexico ", Polk informed Congress 
May II, 1846. Immediately orders were issued to permit Santa 
Anna, then in exile and under sentence of death, to pass into Vera 
Cruz^. A great war was not contemplated, but a war just big 
enough to realize the plan of territorial indemnity. Santa Anna, it 
had been reported to the President, would make certain concessions 
rather than see Mexico ruled by a foreign prince ; he preferred a 
friendly arrangement to the ravages of war. Santa Anna passed the 
American blockade ; Vera Cruz received him as a hero, and he pro- 
ceeded to the capital as the savior of the nation. By the middle of 
August he was in command of the Mexican forces and president 
ad interim of the Mexican Republic. Hardly had he arrived at the 
City of Mexico when Buchanan's note was submitted to him, sug- 
gesting that peace negotiations be forthwith begun.- The offer was 
declined.^ Santa Anna as a military chieftain was not Santa Anna in 
exile. Buchanan's answer to the refusal was that henceforth the 
war would be prosecuted with vigor vintil Mexico offered to make 
terms.^ From now on the war was waged in earnest. It appeared 
no longer to be a little war. Scott took command of the army, and 
the storm-center shifted from the northern provinces to Vera Cruz. 
And yet Mexico gave no sign of a desire for peace. Polk therefore 
was again compelled to make overtures for settlement, and this time 
by offering a specific proposition. In January Buchanan wrote to 
the Mexican minister of foreign affairs that although making " a 
renewed overture for peace " might " be regarded by the world as 
too great a concession to Mexico, yet he " was " willing to subject 
himself to this reproach ". If Mexico so agreed he would send 
commissioners either to Havana or to Jalapa clothed with full powers 
to conclude a treaty of peace and given authority to suspend hos- 
tilities and raise blockades as soon as the Mexican commissioners 
met them.^ The Mexican answer was in spirit like its predecessors : 
Mexico would appoint commissioners aS suggested, but not until 
the blockades were raised and all the territory of the Mexican Re- 
public evacuated by the invading army." Such an answer was tanta- 
mount to a refusal, and so Polk considered it. When, in the middle 
of April, news of the fall of Vera Cruz reached Washington, it 

' George Bancroft to Commodore David Conner, May 13, 1846, H. Ex. Doc. 25, 
30 Congress, I Session, 5. 

2 Buchanan to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 27, 1S46, Congressional 
Globe, 29 Congress, 2 Session, Appendix, 24. 

'The Mexican Minister of Foreign Aflairs to Hiiclianan, August 31, 1846, i/iiJ. 

•Buchanan to same, September 25, 1846, i/iiil. 

5 Buchanan to same, January 18, 1847, S. F.x. Doc. i, 30 Congress, i Session, 36. 

"i Monasterio to Buchanan, February 22, 1S47, iliiil., 37. 



The Treaty of Giiadaliipe-Hidalgo 3 1 3 

was thought that Santa Anna could no longer refuse to negotiate, 
for the American arms were everywhere victorious, and Scott's 
army was on the march toward the capital. 

Now was the time, in Polk's strange phrase, to " conquer a peace ". 
Buchanan informed Mexico that the ofifer to negotiate would not 
be renewed (strong language until the context is heard) until the 
President had reason to believe that it would be accepted by the 
Mexican government. " The President . . . devoted ... to honor- 
able peace ", so wrote Buchanan to the Mexican minister of foreign 
affairs,' " is determined that the evils of the war shall not be pro- 
tracted one day longer than shall be rendered absolutely necessary 
by the Mexican republic. For the purpose of carrying this determi- 
nation into eflfect with the least possible delay, he will forthwith 
send to the head-quarters of the army in Mexico, Nicholas P. Trist, 
esq., the officer next in rank to the undersigned in our department 
of foreign aiifairs, as a commissioner, invested with full powers to 
conclude a definite treaty of peace with the United Mexican States." 
Thus did Polk act upon a plan for negotiation by an agent not con- 
firmed by the Senate, a method quite without precedent or parallel. 
The appointment of public commissioners might only subject the 
United States to the indignity of another refusal and give the Mexi- 
cans encouragement in their opinion concerning the President's 
motives for desiring the termination of the war. Influenced by these 
considerations, he hit upon the plan of sending " to the head-quarters 
of the army a confidential agent, fully acquainted with the views 
of this government, and clothed with full powers to conclude a 
treaty of peace with the Mexican government, should it be so in- 
clined ". He would be enabled in that case " to take advantage, at 
the propitious moment, of any favorable circumstances which might 
dispose that government to peace".^ In the selection of this agent 
the President again proceeded upon altogether unusual lines. Gen- 
eral Scott is authority for the statement that Polk wanted Silas 
Wright to undertake the mission, intimating that Scott would be 
Wright's associate.^ This was surely a strange selection, for Wright 
was a well-known advocate of the Wilmot Proviso, and Scott was 
personally obnoxious to the President. " Scott", said Polk, " is 
utterly unqualified for such a business."' No man of national 
prominence could be expected to assume the role of a confidential 

•Buchanan to Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 15, 1847, ibid., 3S-39. 
Also in Raphael Semmes, Service Afloat and Ashore, during the Mexican War, 303-306. 
2 Buchanan to Trist, April 15, 1847, S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, i Session, 81. 
' Scolt's Aiiiotiocrap/iy, 11, 576. 
* Polk's diary, July 15, 1847. 

AM. HIST. REV VOL. X.— 21 



314 J- S. Reeves 

agent to accompany the army and jump at a propitious moment to 
conclude a treaty. The chief clerk of Buchanan's department, per- 
sonally little known to the President, was selected for the mission, 
a man with but meager training in diplomatic affairs, anything but 
robust in health, irritable, suspicious, timid, and, moreover, given 
to great verbosity of statement. 

Nicholas Philip Trist was a Virginian by birth and was for a time 
a cadet at West Point. He did not graduate, however, but began 
the study of law under Jefferson, whose granddaughter he had 
married. At twenty-eight he was a clerk in the Treasury Depart- 
ment when Jackson selected him as his private secretary. After a 
short service in that capacity he was consul at Havana for eight 
years, whence he was recalled on the ground that he had aided the 
slave-trade.' Soon after the beginning of Polk's administration, he 
was made chief clerk of the State Department, and during his ser- 
vice there he appeared as a hard-working administrative officer in 
the department presided over by the somewhat timid Buchanan and 
really directed by the energetic Polk. The chief clerk gave evidence 
of uncompromising loyalty to the President and thorough sympathy 
with his plans. His selection for this delicate mission was probably 
due not so much to Polk's overestimation of Trist's diplomatic abili- 
ties as to an underestimate of the difficulties of the undertaking. It 
had appeared a simple thing to send Slidell to Mexico as the repre- 
sentative of a strong power to strike a bargain, through claims and 
a bonus, for the cession of New Mexico and California — how could 
so " feeble and distracted a nation as Mexico " refuse a liberal cash 
offer? The answer to that question had been war. Now that Con- 
gress had placed three millions of dollars in Polk's hands for the 
" speedy and honorable conclusion of the war", the President seemed 
to think that to negotiate- a peace treaty upon terms dictated bv 
himself was a mere clerical act for an agent accompanying a vic- 
torious army. 

Whatever may have been the oral instructions which Trist re- 
ceived from the President, the official letter from Buchanan gave 
him small discretionary powers. Trist was handed a projet of a 
treaty, and with it the statement that the extension of the boundaries 
of the United States over New Mexico and Upper California was 
to be considered a sine qua non of any treaty. What Buchanan had 
authorized Slidell to do before the war began was now, thanks to 

'Trist was commissioned consul at Hav.nna .April 24, 1833. 'lyler ordered his 
recall June 22, 1841. There is a mass of correspondence connecting Trist with aiding 
the slave-trade attached to a complaint from fox to Forsyth, Kebru.Tiy 12, 1S40; MS. 
Notes from Hritish Legation to the Department of State. 



The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo 3 1 5 

the victorious advance of the army, made an ultimatum. Trist was- 
authorized to pay in addition to the claims not more than twenty 
millions for the cession of New Mexico and Upper California ; not 
more than five millions additional for Lower California; while the 
right of transit and passage over Tehuantepec was held to be worth 
another five millions, the consideration to be paid in annual instal- 
ments of three millions each. In any event the southwestern bound- 
ary was, of course, to be the Rio Grande. What Slidell had been au- 
thorized to offer twenty-five millions for, Trist was instructed to 
secure for twenty. The provisions as to Lower California and the 
right of transit over Tehuantepec were new, no mention of them hav- 
ing been made when Slidell was sent upon his mission. The projct 
accompanying Trist's instructions contained eleven articles covering- 
the points just referred to. The third article provided that as soon 
as the treaty was ratified by Mexico, the military and naval com- 
manders of both sides should be informed of the action as quickly 
as possible, after which an immediate suspension of hostilities should 
take place. Such was the expression of Polk's idea of " conquering^ 
a peace". Pending the negotiations of peace the L^nited States was 
not to bind itself to discontinue offensive operations against Mexico ; 
hostilities were not to cease until Mexico had actually ratified the 
peace treaty upon our own terms. ^ 

The confidential agent and commissioner left the capital for 
Mexico, and soon Buchanan began to receive Trist's long and tedi- 
ously circumstantial communications. From New Orleans he wrote 
a dozen pages minutely describing his trip and the dangers of the 
journey from Mobile thither. Arrived at Vera Cruz, May 6. he 
quickly despatched two more reports, filled with his views upon the 
officers of the army and things in general. Illness seems to have held 
him for a -.iiile, as his next letter is from Jalapa, dated two weeks 
later. By this time he was involved in a high-tempered and wordy 
epistolary quarrel with the commanding general. Trist had been 
directed by Buchanan to communicate his instructions in confidence 
to Scott and to deliver to him Buchanan's letter for transmission to 
the Mexican minister of foreign affairs. Instead of waiving formali- 
ties and putting himself on friendly and confidential terms with 
Scott, Trist immediately on his arrival at Vera Cruz sent the Ameri- 
can commander a note inclosing the letter from Buchanan sealed 
and with it orders from Marcy. Scott was ever suspicious of the 
administration at Washington, and now he opened the vials of his 
wrath upon the commissioner. He was ordered by the secretary 

' Buchanan's projet, S. Ex. I loc. 52. 30 Congress, I Session, 85-Sg. 



3i6 y- S. Reeves 

of war to yield to Trist the right to decide upon the suspension of 
military operations. It is doubtful if a more astounding order was 
€ver sent to a commanding officer in the field, and Scott replied to 
Trist that the secretary of war proposed to degrade him by requiring 
that he, as commander of the army, should defer to the chief clerk 
of the Department of State the question of continuing or discon- 
tinuing hostilities.' Consequently Scott returned the sealed letter 
from the Department of State and, as a purely military question, 
declined to obey the order of the secretary of war, unless Trist was 
clothed with military rank over him. The next month was spent by 
the commissioner in writing voluminous letters to Scott, which the 
latter answered in kind. Trist lectured the general upon his lack of 
respect for the commissioner sent by the President. Scott replied 
that Trist's letter was such a farrago of insolence, conceit, and 
arrogance as to be a choice specimen of diplomatic literature and 
manners. " The Jacobin convention of France never sent to one 
of its armies in the field a more amiable and accomplished instru- 
ment. If you were armed with an ambulatory guillotine, 3-ou would 
be the personification of Danton. Marat, and St. Just, all in one." ^ 
On June 4 Scott wrote to Marcy, asking to be recalled, owing to the 
many " cruel disappointments and mortifications " he had " been 
made to feel since " leaving " Washington, and the total want of 
support and sympathy on the part of the War Department "''. The 
administration responded with orders to each to cease the disgracefid 
quarrel and to join in carrying out the plans of the government. 

Much of this quarrel doubtless had its origin in politics. The 
military history of the Mexican War is largely made up of jealousy 
and its consequent wrangles, which, ending in arrests and courts- 
martial, were transferred from the field of operations to Washing- 
ton. " The truth is ", Polk wrote in his diary, June 12, " I have 
been compelled from the beginning to conduct the war against 
Mexico through the agency of two generals, highest in rank, who 
have not only no sympathies with the government, but are hostile 
to my administration. Both of them have assumed to control the 
government. To this I will not submit and will as certainly remove 
General Scott from the chief command as he shall refuse or delay to 
obey the order borne him by Mr. Trist."'^ For some time, -however, 

'.Scott to Trist, May 7, 1847, ibitl., 157-159. 

2 Scott to Trist, May 29, 1847, ibid., 172. 

'Scott to Marcy, June 4, 1S47, ibid., 129-131. 

* Marcy to Scott, July 12, 1847, ibid., 131 ; Uuchanan to Trist, July 13, 1847, ibia., 

"3- 

5 Pollc's diary, June 12, 1847. 



7 he Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo 3 1 7 

as their despatches show, Trist and Scott continued their unseemly 
altercation. " Between them ", the diary says, " the orders of the 
Secretary of War and the Secretary of State have been disregarded 
and tlie danger has become imminent that the golden moment for 
conchiding a peace with Mexico may have passed." ' The President 
was for recaUing both Scott and Trist, but the cabinet was unanimous 
in the opinion that it would be bad policy to do so. Realizing Trist's 
inefficiency, Polk then suggested that Soule or Jefferson Davis be 
associated with him, but nothing came of the suggestion." 

Writing from Puebla, June 13, Trist stated that he had had no 
intercourse with Scott for a month, although he had been near him 
for more than that time. His next letter, dated July 7, in which he 
is supposed to have given his reasons for making peace with the 
general, was never received at Washington. Scott made no report 
to the secretary of war from June 4 to July 25. At that time each 
asked that the correspondence relating to the quarrel be suppressed.* 
What caused the reconciliation, so far as their letters show, must 
remain a mystery. During the time in which Trist and Scott were 
quarreling, Trist asked the British minister, Bankhead. and Thorn- 
ton, the British secretary of legation, to transmit to the Mexican 
authorities Buchanan's letter, which Scott had refused to receive. 
Bankhead and Thornton readily acquiesced in his request and for- 
warded the letter to Ibarra, the acting minister of foreign affairs. 
In a few days the commissioner received through the same channel 
of communication the answer of the Mexican government. It was 
that the determination of the question of peace must rest with the 
Mexican congress." 

So far there was no reason to believe the way open for negotia- 
tions. Santa Anna sent a message to congress in which he per- 
emptorily ordered it to state whether or not any propositions for 
peace should be listened to.'' When the Mexican congress scattered 
and made no answer to the message, Santa Anna informed Mackin- 
tosh, the British consul at the City of Mexico, that as he was aban- 
doned by congress, he must, as military chief, endeavor to make 

1 Ibid. 

•^ Ibid., July 9, 1847. 

'Trist to Buchanan, June 13, 1847, S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, I Session, 
178-181. 

'Scott to Marcy, July 25, 1847 : " Since about the 26th ultimo, our intercourse has 
been frequent and cordial ; and I have found him [Trist] able, discreet, courteous, and 
amiable.'' Ibid., \T,^. Trist to Buchanan, July 23, 1S47 : Scott's "character I now be- 
lieve that I had entirely misconceived." Ibid., 302. 

^Ibarra to Trist, June 22, 1847. 

^ Santa Anna to the Mexican Congress, July 16, 1S47. S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Con- 
gress, I Session, 302-305. 



3i8 J- -S- Reeves 

peace.^ His secret agents then intimated to Trist that while nothing 
could be done without the use of money, yet if a million dollars were 
placed in his hands at the conclusion of the peace and ten thousand 
immediately, commissioners would be sent to meet the American 
commissioner and negotiations begun." It was at this juncture 
that Scott and Trist began to be upon the most friendly terms, and 
Trist was a welcome guest at Scott's headquarters. Trist reported 
to Buchanan, upon the authority of Thornton, that Santa Anna 
would let Scott advance close to the City of Mexico and then nego- 
tiate.^ What was not reported was that Scott paid the ten thousand 
dollars of earnest-money after consultation with his officers.* The 
matter did not come to Polk's attention until December, when 'Gen- 
eral Pillow, enraged at what Polk called Scott's persecution of that 
officer, wrote of it to the President."* Scott reported the expendi- 
tures as those for secret service and asserted that he had never 
tempted the honor or patriotism of any man, but held it as lawful in 
morals as in war to purchase valuable information or services vol- 
untarily tendered him.* " General Scott's answer is evasive ", is 
the entry in the diary, " and leaves the irresistible inference that such 
a transaction took place and that it will not bear the light." " Writing 
to Buchanan, July 23, Trist copied a letter received by him from an 
unnamed source. Trist's correspondent, in whom undoubtedly the 
commissioner placed great confidence, wrote : " Santa Anna is afraid 

to make peace now and cannot. M " can do nothing with 

him, even with the aid he possesses from you. S. A. now says se- 

' Thornton to Trist, July 29, 1847, MS. copy, Bureau of Indexes and ."Xrchives, 
Department of State. 

^Ripley's Warwilh Mexico, II, 148-170; Polk's diary, December iS, 1847. 

■^Trist to Buchanan, July 23, 1S47, MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, 
Department of State. 

* Ripley's War unth Mexico, II, 14S-170. General .Shields, however, told I'olk 
that Trist was not present at the conference. Polk's diary, December 28, 1S47. 

5 Polk's diary, February 16, 1848: "The chief clerk of the War Department 
brought to me today a letter received from Majr. Genl. Pillow, dated at the City of 
Mexico on the iSth. of January in answer to a letter of the Secretary of War addressed 
to him in relation to certain proceedings of General Scott and Mr. Trist at Puebla in 
July last concerning an attempt to use money without any authority or sanction of the 
government, to bribe the authorities in Mexico, to secure peace. This letter discloses 
some astounding facts in relation to that infamous transaction and must lead to a further 
investigation." In the letters-received book of the War Department is the following 
entry under date of March 31, 1848 : "Pillow, Maj. Genl. G. J., Mexico, Jany. iS, 
1848. In answer to letter of Sec. War Dec. 24, 1847 and relates to negotiations carried 
on at Puebla in July and Aug. 47." The letter referred to ca»not be found in the 
War Department. 

' Scott to Marcy, February 6, 1848. II. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Congress, I Session, 10S5. 
There is some discrepancy in the date. 

'Polk's diary, February 19, 184S. 

8 Mackintosh ? 



The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo 319 

cretly that he shall allow )'Our army to approach this city [Mexico], 
even as far as the Penon, and then endeavour to make peace. "^ The 
advance of the army, however, was by no means unobstructed. The 
decisive victory at Contreras, followed by that at Churubusco, opened 
the way to the capital. Instead of pushing on to clinch the former 
victories, as the rules of military science would seem to have dictated, 
Scott halted his army and proposed an armistice. Was this done, 
as Scott said, lest the elements of peace might be scattered, or was 
it with the expectation that Santa Anna, with a part of the con- 
sideration cash in hand, would carry out the balance of the bargain? 
Through the good offices of Thornton, who with Bankhead and 
^lackintosh played a large part in all these negotiations, the armistice 
became effective August 24. Santa Anna appointed as commis- 
sioners four well-known peace men to meet the American commis- 
sioner. 

The opportunity for which Trist had been waiting since May 
was now presented. Santa Annas commissioners met him as agreed. 
No further evidence of Trist's utter incapacity is needed than his 
own account of the conferences. Two days before the first meeting 
he made known to Santa Anna that in order to secure the boundary 
defined in his projet, with the right of transit over the isthmus, he 
was authorized and willing to go as high as the highest sum named 
in his instructions. This amount, he said, might be paid in such a 
way as to enable Santa Anna to convert all of it into cash as soon as 
the treaty was ratified.^ Such an unfortunate admission had the 
result he might have expected. Santa Anna's commissioners sub- 
mitted a counter-projet conceding nothing but Upper California 
north of the thirty-seventh parallel, for which the United States was 
expected to assume the claims and pay a bonus''. The Mexican 
commissioners insisted on the Nueces as a boundary, declaring that 
if peace were established it must be at that river. Trist hesitated 
and then oiifered to refer the question to Washington, thereby pro- 
posing to extend the armistice for at least forty-five days. ■" No more 
flagrant disobedience of orders was ever committed. The war had 
been begun and waged upon the theory that the Rio Grande was 
the ancient boundary of Texas. What persuaded Trist to submit tli"" 
matter for further instructions is incomprehensible. He himself 

''I'rist to Buchanan, July 23, 1847, ^- S-, Ju'y 25. M.S., Kureau of Indexes and 
Archives, Despatches, Mexico, Vol. 14. 

^Trist to Buchanan, September 4, 1847, MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, 
Department of State. 

'S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, i Session, 339. 

*The Mexican Commissioners to the Minister of Relations, September 7, 1S47, 
Ibid., 344-346. 



320 J- S. Reeves 

explained it by saying that the Mexican commissioners led him to 
believe that a part of New Mexico would be ceded if the Nueces 
were accepted as a boundary. There was no reasonable foundation 
in fact, however, for any such belief, for Mexico demanded Trist's 
decision within three days upon the-counter-projet, by the terms of 
which New Mexico was to remain a Mexican province. Before that 
short time had elapsed Santa Anna's violations of the armistice be- 
came so notorious that Scott gave notice of its termination. The 
American army moved toward the capital and entered it only after 
two of the bloodiest battles of the war. Santa Anna's army was 
scattered and without a leader. Notwithstanding all this, Trist was 
blind to Santa Anna's duplicity. As late as September 27 he wrote 
that he was perfectly convinced of Santa Anna's sincere desire for 
peace, but that peace was an impossibility upon the terms of Buch- 
anan's instructions.'^ The armistice was a strategic blunder, giving 
Santa Anna opportunity to mass his forces for the defense of the 
capital, and the heavy losses suffered by Scott's army at ]\Iolino del 
Rey were the price paid for it. The overtures for peace displayed 
the gullibility of Trist, whose persistent belief that Santa Anna once 
bought would stay bought led him to ignore his instructions and to 
disobey Polk's most positive orders. 

Before Trist's reports of his inglorious conferences reached 
Washington, Polk had read the Mexican accounts of the affair sent 
from Vera Cruz. The President at once ordered Trist's recall. 
" Mr. Trist is recalled ", says the diary, " because his remaining 
longer with the army could not probably accomplish the objects of 
his mission, and because his remaining longer might and probably 
would impress the Mexican government with the belief that the 
United States are so anxious for peace, that they would ultimate [ly] 
conclude one upon Mexican terms. Mexico must now sue for peace 
and when she does, we will hear her proposition." ^ Trist's actions 
had surely merited his recall, but Polk's policy of continually making 
overtures, first by a series of notes suggesting peace and finally by 
sending a commissioner, gave Mexico exactly the belief which Polk 
attributed to Trist's blundering efforts alone. The policy was ill- 
advised and its instrument incompetent. 

The occupation of the City of Mexico, September 14, completely 
changed the complexion of affairs. Two days later Santa Anna 
resigned the presidency, and by so doing removed the one great 
obstacle to peace. Within a week after Santa Anna's abdication 

'Trist to Buchanan, September 27, 1847, ibid., 201. 

^Polk's diary, October 5, 1S47. Trist's despatcli of September 4 was received 
October 21. 



The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 321 

plans were well under way for the reorganization of the government 
under the auspices of well-known modcrados. Before it had been 
accomplished Trist again asked the Mexican commissioners to meet 
him. A month elapsed before he had an answer, and he asked 
Buchanan for permission to return home, as the weakness of the new 
government might keep him " hanging here for an indefinite period " 
without accomplishing anything.^ Buchanan's letter of recall reached 
Trist November 16. Trist acknowledged it. waived for the moment 
any defense of his actions, and stated that he would start home at 
once. Following hard upon the receipt of his recall Trist received 
word, again through Thornton, that the new Mexican administra- 
tion had appointed commissioners.^ He replied, November 24, 
that, as he was about to return to the United States, whatever over- 
tures Mexico desired to make would be forwarded through Scott 
to Washington.^ Despite this statement and notwithstanding his 
orders to return, he began immediately to negotiate with the Mexican 
commissioners upon the basis of his original instructions. The 
reasons for this change in plans are set forth in a letter of sixty pages 
written December 6.* This letter was certainly of a character to 
arouse the President's indignation. The diary describes it as " im- 
pudent, arrogant, very insulting to the government and personally 
offensive to the President ". The writer of it was " destitute of 
honor or principle and contemptibly base ". " It is manifest to me ", 
wrote Polk, " that he has become the tool of General Scott and his 
menial instrument and that the paper was written at Scott's instance 
and direction. I directed the Secretary of War to write to Major 
General Butler [who had superseded Scott], directing him, if Mr. 
Trist was still with the headquarters of the army, to order him oiT 
and to inform the authorities of Mexico that he had no authority to 
treat." ^ Scott, writing at the same time, said : " No proposition has 
been made to mc, looking to a peace, by the federal government of 
this republic, or its commissioners ; the latter understood to be still 
in this city. I have not seen them." '' 

This long despatch of Trist's doubtless justified Polk's suspicion 
that Scott instigated it. While Trist said that the government would 
be left at liberty to disavow his act, he set forth his reasons for 

' Trist to Buchanan, October 31, 1847, S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, I Session, 213. 

2 Thornton to Trist, November 22, 1847, and to Pena y Pena, November 24, 1847, 
ibid., 231. 

3 Trist to Fena y Pena, November 24, 1847, ibid. 

•Trist to Buchanan, December 6, 1847, received January 15, 1848, ibid., 231-266 
^ Polk's diary, January 15, 1848. 

S.Scott to Marcy, December 4, 1817, H. E"x. Doc. 60. 30 Congress, i Session, 
'033-1035- 



322 J. S. Reeves 

reopening negotiations as: i, that peace was still the desire of the 
President ; 2, that unless he seized the opportunity offered, no other 
chance for peace would remain : 3, that the boundaries stipulated in 
his instructions were as much as Mexico would ever yield ; and 4, 
that his recall was based upon a supposed state of facts the reverse 
of the truth. Underlying all of his arguments in support of these 
reasons is the thinly-disguised innuendo that the President had 
changed his plans and now favored the annexation of all Mexico. 
In other words, Trist proceeded to make a treaty embodying Polk's 
original idea of territorial indemnity with the express- intention of 
throwing upon the President the unpleasant alternative of either 
accepting the treaty or rejecting it. If Polk rejected it, he must bear 
the odium of seeking to annihilate Mexico as a nation and of renew- 
ing a war which was now unpopular. If he accepted it, he would 
then, according to Trist's belief, sacrifice his cherished wish, the con- 
quest of the whole of Mexico. Such is the import of this unique 
despatch. Trist's assumption that Polk desired the absorption of all 
Mexico has been proved to be baseless.^ Reasonably enough, the 
President felt that the amount of money to be paid Mexico for the 
cession should be less than would have been the case had the war 
ceased seven months before. Pillow was in favor of greater terri- 
torial indemnity and claimed while in Mexico to be the President's 
mouthpiece. Trist shared Scott's hatred of that officer, and the 
parts of the despatch not directly or by inference attacking Polk are 
filled with venom against Pillow. 

Before Butler had an opportunity to carry out Polk's order, Trist 
had signed the treaty and sent it on its way to Washington. There 
are no detailed accounts of the conferences of which the treaty was 
the result. We know that for two months Trist met the commis- 
sioners daily, that the original projet was taken as a basis for the 
negotiation, and that there was apparently little difficulty in agreeing 
upon boundaries. The question of claims and of the condition of 
the inhabitants of the ceded territory occupied most of the meetings. 
The result was in hand February 2, 1848, when Trist met the Mex- 
ican commissioners to sign the treaty at Guadalupe-Hidalgo. " a 
spot ", said Trist, " which, agreeably to the creed of this country, is 
the most sacred on earth, as being the scene of the miraculous ap- 
pearance of the Virgin, for the purpose of declaring that Mexico was 
taken under her special protection ".- 

Seventeen days later Polk had in his hands the grant of territory 

'"The United States and Mexico, 1847-1848", by Professor E. G. Bourne, in 
American Historical Review, V, 491-502, April, 1900. 

2 Trist to Buchanan, February 2, 184S, S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, i Session, I02. 



The Treaty of Guadalupe- Hidalgo 323 

which he had hoped to obtain through the peaceful negotiations of 
Slidell. The Rio Grande was acknowledged as the boundary of 
Texas ; New Mexico and Upper California were ours ; and the sum 
to be paid was that named in Trist's instructions : the treaty included 
all of Polk's sine qua non. That the right of transit over Tehuan- 
tepec was not included was a small matter, for the recent treaty with 
New Granada afiforded a better route to the Pacific. Benton's com- 
ment upon the treaty was that it was a fortunate event for the United 
States and especially for Polk's administration. " The Congress 
elections were going against the administration, and the aspirants for 
the presidency in the cabinet were struck with terror at the view of 
the great military reputations which were growing up." ' 

Haste in acting upon the treaty was of the utmost importance for 
two reasons : first, that the treaty might be returned to Mexico for 
ratification before the Mexican government should be overthrown ; 
and second, that the growing sentiment for " all of Mexico ", both in 
the cabinet and out of it, a sentiment to which the President was 
opposed, might be effectually stifled.- Polk made up his mind at 
once not to reject the treaty because of Trist's conduct. His desire 
for peace was so great that he did not permit himself to be influenced 
by his indignation at Trist's insulting letters. He decided, after 
stating his views to the cabinet, to send the document to the Senate, 
suggesting certain amendments and by so doing show a " magnani- 
mous forbearance toward Mexico ". Every member of the Senate 
committee on foreign relations, with the exception of the chairman, 
Sevier, was at first opposed to ratification. The reason for dieir 
attitude, as reported by the chairman to Polk, was not the terms of 
the treaty, but Trist's lack of authority to negotiate. " I told Sevier", 
the diary records, " that the treaty was the subject for consideration, 
not Trist's conduct and that if the provisions of the treaty were such 
as would be accepted, it would be worse than an idle ceremony to 
send out a grand commission to re-negotiate the same treaty." '' The 
Senate committee reported the treaty without amendment on the 
same day, and after two weeks' discussion the Senate first amended 
and then ratified it by a vote of thirty-eight to fourteen. The most 
important of the amendments was made at the suggestion of the 

'Benton's Thirty Years' View, II, 710. 

^Professor Bourne's article as cited. The treaty arrived in Washington February 
19; Polk decided to send it to the Senate for ratification t'ebruary 21. Polk's diary, 
February 21, 1848. Calhoun wrote to Clenison, March 7, 1848 : " The greatest danger 
is, that the [Mexican] Government may not hold together until the treaty is exchanged. 
Nothing but the countenance of our Government, and the support of capitalists interested 
in preserving it, can continue it in existence. It is, indeed, but the shadow of a Gov- 
ernment." Report of American Hist^^ricnl Aisocinlion, iSgg, II, 746. 

'Polk's diary, February 28, 1848. 



US,!."'' CONGRESS 



/ S. /beeves 




\\ 



President, and by it the tenth article, relating to the disposition of 
the public lands in Texas, was stricken out. An additional secret 
article, delaying for eight months the time of Mexico's ratification, 
was for obvious reasons omitted by a unanimous vote. Sevier and 
Clififord, the latter Polk's attorney-general, were appointed commis- 
sioners in accordance with the provision of the treaty permitting the 
exchange of ratifications at the City of Mexico. As their duties were 
merely the gaining of Mexico's consent to the Senate's amendments. 
and the hastening of final ratification, their task was light. As soon 
as it was known that the Senate was modifying the terms of the 
agreement as signed, the Mexican government ceased all efforts for 
ratification until the nature of the amendments was known. .A. few 
days after the arrival of Sevier and Clifford at Mexico with the 
amended treaty, the ?ilexican congress agreed to ratification by prac- 
tically a unanimous vote. 

There was no glory in all this for Trist. Polk characterized him 
as an " impudent and unqualified scoundrel ". Upon his arrival at 
Washington the former chief clerk of the State Department found 
the doors closed to him. He could get the ear of no one, and after 
vainly trying for some time to collect his salary after the date of his 
recall, he left Washington. Insisting on having a hearing, he ad- 
dressed a long communication to the speaker of the House August 
7, 1848, accusing the President of high crimes and misdemeanors, 
including subornation of perjury, and suggesting that Polk be im- 
peached.^ But there was no need for stirring up the matter in the 
hope of finding political capital against Polk. The time had gone 
by for that. The letter was received during the last days of the 
session and referred to the committee on foreign affairs, and there 
it slept. The war was over ; Polk's term was drawing to a close : 
and the country was in the midst of a presidential campaign. Trist 
was soon forgotten. The result of the election of 1848 was the 
choice of Taylor for President, one of the two great Whig generals 
who had reaped the political popularity which Polk had coveted. 
Scott was for the time passed by, and nobody had any consideration 
for the assertive and talkative commissioner who had made the treaty 
of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. But the persistent Trist did not despair, and 
twenty-two years later he secured from Congress the reward for his 
successful presumption.- The feeble old man, who had been one of 
Jefferson's family and afterward the friend of Jackson, was at last 
secure in the belief that he had been vindicated by his government. 

Jesse S. Reeves. 

' Congresiioiial Globe, 30 Congress, I Session, 1057-1058. 
^Senate Report 261, 41 Congress, 2 Session. 



